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We study the effect of public-to-private buyout transactions on investments in innovation
using an international sample over the 1997–2017 period. We use patent counts and ci-
tations to proxy for the quantity, quality and economic importance of innovation. Our
results are based on time analysis and matched sample regressions. The data indicate
that buyouts are associated with a significant reduction in patents and patent citations,
including a reduction in radical (i.e. more scientific) patents. When we split the sample
into institutional and management buyouts, the negative effect of buyouts is confirmed
only for institutional buyouts. This suggests that only institutional buyouts prevent target
firms from adopting long-term investments. This finding is confirmed by reductions in in-
novator employment and innovation efficiency subsequent to going private. Moreover, the
data indicate that the negative effect is most prevalent for transactions where the cost of
the deal’s debt financing is higher than that of the debt post-buyout. We rule out some al-
ternative explanations for these findings, including but not limited to outliers, truncation
bias and endogeneity.
Introduction
The global economy has undergone a profound
shift in ownership structure over the past few
decades. A significant share of firms is now owned
by institutional investors from the private equity
(PE) industry, and the effect on target firms con-
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tinues to be debated. PE firms acquire publicly
listed firms, delist them and restructure them. Post-
buyout transaction, existing theories suggest that,
theoretically, target firms’ operating performance,
investment and productivity should improve
(Jensen, 1989). The intuition is straightforward:
PE managers are value-adding active investors
that put into place efficient incentive and moni-
toring mechanisms, together with debt discipline,
to enhance firm productivity and performance
(Ahlers et al., 2017; Amess, Stiebale and Wright,
2016; Cornelli and Karakaş, 2015; Jensen, 1989).
In contrast, however, critics argue that PE firms
are transitory organizations (Kaplan, 1991). They
have an overly strong focus on projects with short-
term payoffs, and tend to reduce investments in
long-term projects in order to ensure they can
meet their debt-servicing obligations (Rappaport,
1990). One example of the ‘dark’ side of PE deals
is the buyout of Debenhams, a public-to-private
deal that took place in 2003 in the UK. This deal
generated enormous profits for the PE owners,
but it left the firm with massive debt, and its value
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plummeted after the IPO.1 In subsequent years, it
was not able to service its debt, and was taken over
by its lenders in 2019.2 Another example is the
US$24 billion buyout of Dell Technologies Inc.
by PE firm Silver Lake in 2013, which currently
stands as the largest technology firm buyout. In
this case, the company was in tatters by 2018, with
its financial position described as follows:
Dell Technologies Inc. seems to be taking a Don-
ald Trump-like approach to determining its self-
worth: bold statements, and not a lot of information
to back them up…Dell is saddled with a boatload of
debt and a messy capital structure…3
As a result, the industry as a whole, as well as
many academics, have begun to question the posi-
tive effects of such short-term thinking.4
Additional research has explored the effects of
taking firms private in buyout transactions, but the
empirical evidence is decidedly mixed. In fact, re-
cent evidence has provided some puzzling results
about the real outcome of buyout transactions.
Several studies show positive effects of buyouts
on the productivity and innovation of target firms
(Amess, Stiebale and Wright, 2016; Davis et al.,
2014; Lerner, Sorensen and Strömberg, 2011);
others have questioned the post-buyout results
of performance and productivity improvements
(Ayash and Rastad, 2017; Ayash and Schütt, 2016;







4For example, Laurence Fink, the CEO of BlackRock,
said in 2015 that: ‘The effects of the short-termist phe-
nomenon are troubling (...) In the face of these pres-
sures, more and more corporate leaders have responded
with actions that can deliver immediate returns to share-
holders, such as buybacks or dividend increases, while
underinvesting in innovation, skilled workforces or es-
sential CAPEX necessary to sustain long-term growth.’
More recently, Elon Musk failed in his attempt to take
Tesla’s stock private in an effort to avoid the pub-
lic pressures of the stock market. Stephen Diamond,
associate law professor at Santa Clara University, de-
scribed him as follows: ‘Musk represents the leading edge
of an unfortunate Silicon Valley trend: the narcissistic
CEO and the board that lacks the gravitas, experience
and independence to consider ordinary investors’ inter-
ests’ (https://www.sfchronicle.com/business/article/Tesla-
shareholders-reject-move-to-split-CEO-12970015.php).
Mills and Towery, 2014; Goergen, O’Sullivan and
Wood, 2014a, 2014b; Weir, Jones and Wright,
2015).
With these questions in mind, we revisit how
public-to-private buyout transactions impact long-
term investments in innovation. Although many
papers have studied operating performance, pro-
ductivity and employment changes post-buyout,
more compelling evidence about the overall effect
of buyouts on innovation would be instructive.
Davis et al.’s (2014) influential paper on buyouts
and productivity calls particularly for research on
deals executed during the most recent buyout wave
of 2006–2007 and the post-2008–2009 global fi-
nancial crisis. The 2006–2007 buyout wave allowed
PE firms to exploit cheap access to credit, which
may have changed their motives for such trans-
actions. We note that prior work on buyouts and
innovation generally preceded the global financial
crisis, and focused largely on US and UK data.
In this paper, we use a comprehensive sample
of public-to-private buyout transactions, and a
dataset that covers the most recent buyout wave
and financial crisis. We study two specific transac-
tion types: institutional buyouts (IBOs) and man-
agement buyouts (MBOs). In an IBO, the PE fund
acquires a controlling interest in the target firm,
hires new management and typically exits within
5 years; in an MBO, current management takes a
large ownership stake in the company. The goals
of the two groups may be very different. IBO in-
vestors are mainly focused on delivering returns
on the transaction; MBO investors are focused on
servicing sustainable debt, as well as on long-term
planning.
To study how public-to-private buyouts im-
pact long-term innovation, we use a unique in-
ternational dataset over the 1997–2017 period.
Our measures of innovation are based on patents
registered in each country’s office, provided by
EPO’s Worldwide Patent Statistical Database
(PATSTAT). The depth of the data allows us to
create measures that have not been used before,
such as radical innovation and innovation effi-
ciency.
Our tests are based on before–after buyout anal-
ysis, with fixed effects and difference-in-differences
methodology for buyout and control samples of
public firms. We find that buyouts generally re-
duce investments in innovation, asmeasured by the
number of patents and citations. These effects are
quite substantial in terms of quantity and quality.
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We observe a 17% post-buyout decline in the num-
ber of patents in year 2, and up to 22% by year 3.
The drop in quality ranges from 24% to 45%, and is
observed mostly in years 2 and 3. When we distin-
guish between institutional and management buy-
outs, we find that, in the case of public-to-private
buyouts by institutional investors, the effect on in-
novation remains negative. The analysis of public
firms taken private bymanagement is inconclusive.
We find a consistently negative effect following
public-to-private buyouts for a sample of firms
that engaged in what we refer to as radical inno-
vation (i.e. a higher level of scientific innovation
that cites non-patent literature). Furthermore, we
test whether target firms become more efficient in
terms of innovative activities. We find that innova-
tion efficiency decreases after a public-to-private
buyout. We also find that the negative effect de-
pends on PE investors’ syndicate size.
We attempt to explain the underlying reasons
for the negative effect of buyouts on innovation,
and find it is mostly driven by the relative cost
of debt. In particular, if the acquirer cannot lock
in financing for the buyout transaction at a lower
rate than other market participants’ cost of debt,
it may negatively impact investment and therefore
innovation.
This paper contributes to the literature on the
effects of ownership changes, and in particular,
the effects of buyout transactions on innova-
tion. Lerner, Sorensen and Strömberg (2011) find
that innovation increases after leveraged buyouts
(LBOs). Their US-based sample extends through
2005, and the vast majority of their deals are
private-to-private transactions. Similarly, Amess,
Stiebale and Wright (2016) show an increase in in-
novative activity for their sample of UK deals, al-
though they state that most of the effect comes
from private-to-private transactions.
In contrast, our study differs in several key
ways. For example, we study public-to-private
buyouts, and our sample is international. The
distinction between public-to-private and private-
to-private deals is important, as previous studies
have suggested. However, to date, none has fo-
cused on a detailed analysis of public-to-private
deals. We also capture a different time span, which
covers the global financial crisis and the second
LBO wave (2005–2007). We find some evidence
that this negative effect of buyouts on innova-
tion exists primarily in the post-2006 period. We
provide evidence based on ‘time-trend’ analysis
for the buyout sample, as well as ‘difference-in-
differences’ results for the matched sample, which
mitigates potential endogeneity concerns. We also
distinguish betweenMBOs and IBOs, which affect
changes in innovation in very different ways.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows.
The next section outlines a literature review and
develops our hypotheses. The third section dis-
cusses our research design, while the fourth sec-
tion presents the data. Our main results are in the
fifth section, followed by additional analyses in the
sixth section. The last section concludes.
Literature review and hypothesis
development
Prior literature suggests that ownership structure
plays an important role in corporate innovation,
because it represents the financing choices, gover-
nance and incentives of the owners. An early study
by Aghion and Tirole (1994) explores the exis-
tence of innovation under different structures. Be-
lenzon, Berkovitz and Bolton (2009) suggest that
companies choose the corporate form that is the
most conducive to undertaking research and de-
velopment. Many studies have also examined how
various ownership forms affect innovation, focus-
ing explicitly on short- versus long-term value
creation.
Some research has found that firms may not
invest in long-term projects due to short-term per-
formance pressures (Bushee, 1998, 2001; Graham,
Harvey and Rajgopal, 2005; Stein, 1988). Own-
ers may expropriate firm resources and impede
innovative activities. Manso (2011) suggests that,
ideally, organizing and motivating systems should
build in a certain amount of tolerance for failure,
as well as reward for long-term success. Moreover,
Ferreira, Manso and Silva (2012) show that going
public is optimal when exploiting existing ideas,
and going private is optimal when exploring new
ideas. Empirical evidence shows that innovation
generally declines after private firms go public
(Bernstein, 2015).
Alternatively, some owner types may enhance
innovative activities by serving as active monitors,
encouraging management to invest in long-term
projects (Burkart, Gromb and Panunzi, 1997;
Gillan and Starks, 2000; Kahn and Winton, 1998;
Shleifer and Vishny, 1986). For example, Aghion,
Van Reenen and Zingales (2013) show that
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institutional ownership is associated with more
innovation. Boot and Vladimirov (2018) show
that ownership and innovation can even exhibit
a U-shaped relationship when we take into ac-
count market collusion. This occurs when public
ownership nurtures innovation, and where the
probability of success is either very low or very
high. Financing of innovation also matters.
Atanassov, Nanda and Seru (2007) show that
public firms that rely on equity or public debt tend
to be more innovative.
The buyout transaction is a particular form of
ownership change, generally undertaken by PE
firms or firm management using a substantial ex-
ternal source of funding (usually debt). Intuitively,
the purpose is to restructure the target firm. In-
vestors aim to install more efficient incentivemech-
anisms and monitoring, and to improve corpo-
rate governance and capital structure (Ahlers et al.,
2017; Amess, Stiebale and Wright, 2016; Cornelli
andKarakaş, 2015; Jensen, 1989; Lerner, Sorensen
and Strömberg, 2011).
Several theories motivate the value gains from
public-to-private transactions through restructur-
ing activities that theoretically rely on the re-
duction of shareholder-related agency costs. This
agency conflict might impose significant costs on
public firm shareholders due to the fact that the
manager acting as an agent has decision power
and an informational advantage over shareholders
(Jensen and Meckling, 1976). The change in own-
ership should reduce those costs and improve tar-
get firm value, performance and productivity.5
However, although the intended goals of
public-to-private buyouts are to improve target
firm performance, the debt burden may ultimately
have a negative effect on its long-term invest-
ment. Kaplan (1991) states that PE firms are
transitory organizations that focus on projects
with short-term payoffs while reducing long-term
investments. Rappaport (1990) claims that debt
discipline and concentrated ownership can impose
significant adjustment costs. Debt can dramat-
ically increase the leverage of target firms, and
default risk becomes a primary concern. More-
over, financing is often sourced from multiple debt
providers, so refinancing becomes more difficult
to achieve (Axelson et al., 2013; Colla, Ippolito
5For a more detailed discussion of value drivers in public-
to-private transactions, see the review by Renneboog and
Vansteenkiste (2017).
and Wagner, 2012; Demiroglu and James, 2010;
Graham and Leary, 2011).
We distinguish further between IBOs and
MBOs, the two buyout types. In the case of IBOs,
the PE fund, as the owner, is in fact an interme-
diary that must provide returns to its investors.
PE firms represent limited partners that provide
funding, and typically expect to be repaid within
5 to 10 years. Therefore, although the investment
search for the PE fund may take 2 to 3 years,
the actual turnaround period can last for 3 to
7 years.
Subsequently, PE funds plan exits that might
include the return of the target firm to public
ownership or a sale to another acquirer. Most
exercise that option between the second and fifth
year post-buyout (Kaplan, 1991). Thus, PE funds’
investment horizons are generally up to 5 years.
In general, the effect of IBOs on innovation might
be positive due to efficient incentive mechanisms,
concentrated monitoring and improvements in
corporate governance and capital structure. But
short-term turnaround periods and excessive debt
pressure might dampen long-term investments in
innovation.
MBOs are subject to similar pressures as IBOs,
but shareholder intolerance to failure is another
factor in these types of deals. Kamoto (2017)
shows that it can weaken managerial innovation
incentives in public firms. Therefore, going pri-
vate in an MBO deal releases management from
the dismissal risk posed by this factor. Yet, we do
not know to what extent the short-termism of in-
vestors onmanagerial innovation incentives affects
post-MBO long-term investment. Subsequently,
corporate governance issues exacerbated by dis-
persed ownership may aggravate agency problems.
Thompson and Wright (1995) suggest that,
through MBOs, bureaucratic incentives are be-
ing replaced by market-based incentives. The re-
unification of ownership with control after an
MBO should motivate owner-managers to max-
imize profits. In the context of patenting, we
thus expect that managers involved in MBOs
will be financially motivated to pursue patent-
ing activity if they believe it will maximize
profits.
Theory remains somewhat unclear about the
actual effect of public-to-private buyout transac-
tions on long-term investment, but the empirical
evidence does not offer a compelling answer ei-
ther. The literature has mostly debated the effects
© 2020 The Authors. British Journal of Management published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd on behalf of British
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of buyout transactions on operating performance,
productivity and employment, with mixed results.
We summarize next.
Early evidence based on plant-level data sug-
gests that PE buyouts exhibit positive effects on
productivity (Lichtenberg and Siegel, 1990). There
is also some evidence of improved operating per-
formance during the first buyout wave (Baker and
Wruck, 1989; Kaplan, 1989; Smith, 1990). More
recently, Davis et al. (2014) show that, while buy-
outs can lead to job losses, they also tend to bring
productivity improvements. Guo, Hotchkiss and
Song (2011) find evidence of a positive effect on
productivity after a buyout. Similarly, Acharya
et al. (2012) and Weir, Jones and Wright (2015)
find small improvements in operating performance
post-LBO for a UK sample, while Bergström,
Grubb and Jonsson (2007) and Boucly, Sraer and
Thesmar (2011) find larger operating improve-
ments post-LBO for other countries. Harford and
Kolasinski (2013) study wealth creation at the time
of PE investor exit, and find no evidence for the
short-termism view of buyouts.
Other studies, however, present a different view
of the effect of buyouts on target firm efficiency.
Bharath, Dittmar and Sivadasan (2014) use a US
sample and find that going private does not seem
to change firm productivity. In fact, they find some
evidence of underinvestment. Cohn, Mills and
Towery (2014) and Leslie and Oyer (2008), using
a sample of US LBOs, find little or no evidence of
operating improvements following a buyout. Sim-
ilarly, Ayash and Schütt (2016) find no economi-
cally significant improvement in operating perfor-
mance following buyouts, and Ayash and Rastad
(2017) question productivity improvement claims
in prior literature. In a UK buyout context, Go-
ergen, O’Sullivan and Wood (2014a, 2014b) show
that the performance and productivity of IBOs
tend to decrease post-transaction.
Moreover, the effect of buyouts may depend on
investor type, as Ughetto (2010) finds for private-
to-private transactions in Europe. There is some
evidence that PE IBOs tend to have a negative ef-
fect on employment and productivity (Goergen,
O’Sullivan and Wood, 2014a, 2014b; Guery et al.,
2017), with the opposite effect for MBOs. Kaplan
(1989), Smart and Waldfogel (1994) and Smith
(1990) all find very large improvements for US
MBOs in the 1980s.
The effect of buyouts on innovation has not
attracted sufficient attention, however, and there
are few empirical tests. Evidence for the UK
for 1998–2005 shows that the effect is more
pronounced for private-to-private deals (Amess,
Stiebale and Wright 2016). Lerner, Sorensen
and Strömberg (2011) use a US sample over
1983–2005 and find a positive effect of PE on
innovation.
To summarize the theoretical arguments and
extant empirical evidence, it is not clear ex ante
whether public-to-private transactions have a pos-
itive or negative effect on innovation. On the
one hand, improvements in corporate governance,
managerial incentives and discipline should pos-
itively impact innovation. On the other hand,
the debt burden and short-term constraints im-
posed on PE investors can significantly hamper
innovative activity. The effect may also differ de-
pending on investor type (institutional or man-
agement). Ultimately, we leave it as an empirical
question.
Research design
Our research design focuses on two sets of results.
First, we analyse the ‘before–after’ time trends for
the sample of firms that went private. We compare
innovation levels after going private to those ex-
hibited when the firms were public. Second, we im-
plement ‘difference-in-differences’ (DiD) tests to
analyse the changes in innovation of going-private
firms compared to a control group of matched
firms that remained public.
The ‘before–after’ methodology
In order to examine the changes within the going-
private group, we run the following ordinary least
squares (OLS) regression:
yi,t = α + βkDk + θ Controlst−1 + FE + εi,t (1)
where yi,t is the outcome variable (innovation
measures), Dk are dummy variables that equal
1 for year k after the buyout transaction (nega-
tive values correspond to years before the buy-
out), ‘Controls’ is a vector of country character-
istics and FE are firm- and year-country fixed
effects. The term εi,t stands for residual error. The
estimated coefficients on betas are the average ef-
fect of the buyout transaction for a particular
year.
© 2020 The Authors. British Journal of Management published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd on behalf of British
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The ‘difference-in-differences’ methodology
The ‘before–after’ analysis of innovation for firms
that went private is ultimately driven by country-
, industry- or firm-related characteristics such as
age and size. In order to eliminate this potential
source of endogeneity, we form a matched control
group for each going-private firm in our sample of
buyouts. Similar to the procedure for the going-
private firms, we first ensure that the control group
firms have patent activity. Then, we select up to five
matched control firms that remained public based
on country, industry, event year (announcement),
age and size. We thus have ‘cells’ of one going-
private firm, and up to five matched controls. We
delete ‘cells’ where the number of control firms is
lower than three. We estimate the following regres-
sion model:
yi,t = α + δk Buyout ∗ Dk + γ Buyout + βkDk
+FEC + εi,t (2)
where yi,t is the outcome variable (innovation mea-
sures) and Dk are dummy variables that equal 1
for year k after the buyout transaction (negative
values correspond to years before the buyout). We
omit year 0. FEC are ‘cell’ fixed effects. The term
εi,t stands for residual error. The estimated coeffi-
cients on deltas are the average treatment effect of
the buyout transaction for a particular year com-
pared to the control sample.
Data
Sample construction
To establish our sample, we first obtain buyout
transactions from the Zephyr database.6 We only
analyse deals where the acquirer bought 100% of
the listed target firm. We choose Zephyr because it
shares common identities with the Orbis database.
We then merge Zephyr and Orbis with the detailed
patent data derived PATSTAT, for which Bureau
van Dijk has assigned unique applicant firm iden-
tifiers.7 PATSTAT provides data on patent appli-
6Zephyr has been used in previous studies (e.g. Erel, Jang
and Weisbach, 2015).
7Merging PATSTAT data with that of other datasets re-
quires fuzzy matching based on firms’ names. This is an
involved process that uses country-specific dictionaries of
legal entity names, common names and phrases. String
matching algorithms are then used to match firm names
across different datasets.
cations filed in over 90 offices around the world.
It contains basic bibliographic information, in-
cluding date of application, date of patent grant,
track record of patent citations and inventor iden-
tification for each patent application. PATSTAT
is published biannually; we use the autumn 2017
edition.
The PATSTAT database covers patents filed in
93 countries. It therefore provides even greater
coverage than the National Bureau of Economic
Research (NBER) Patent and Citation database,
which is compiled from information in the United
States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO)
(Moshirian et al., 2019). The USPTO only aggre-
gates patents filed in the USA.
In summary, using databases that share com-
mon identifiers allows us to avoid many pitfalls.
Both Zephyr and Orbis are provided by the same
supplier, Bureau van Dijk, so we can match deal
information to firm-level data more accurately. We
furthermatch these data with PATSTAT. Then, us-
ing PATSTAT data, we can directly measure firms’
innovation levels, regardless of where the patent
application was filed.
We include all completed buyout transactions
from 1997 to 2011 for an international sam-
ple of countries that includes Austria, Belgium,
Canada, Switzerland, Czech Republic, Germany,
Denmark, Spain, Finland, France, the UK, Israel,
Italy, Japan, Korean Republic, Netherlands, Nor-
way, Poland, Sweden, Singapore and the USA.
Our sample is mostly dominated by US deals, fol-
lowed by those in Canada, Japan, France, the UK
and Germany. Our sample of buyout deals termi-
nates in 2011, because we require 6 years of post-
buyout patent data in order to construct the patent
citation measures.
We only include buyout deals where the tar-
get firm had at least one successful patent ap-
plied for and granted from the 3 years prior to the
3 years after the transaction (similarly to Lerner,
Sorensen and Strömberg, 2011). Our final sam-
ple is comprised of 307 going-private deals in-
volving 26,360 patents, of which 33% are con-
ducted in cross-border deals where the target and
acquirer are from different countries. Generally,
38% of acquirers are classified as very large (i.e.
total assets greater than 260 million USD), 10%
as large (i.e. total assets greater than 26 mil-
lion USD), 10% as medium size (i.e. total as-
sets greater than 2.6 million USD) and 42% as
small.
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Measuring innovation
Our primary goal is to measure innovation quan-
tity and quality. We use a simple patent count
to proxy for innovation quantity, and two other
measures to evaluate quality and importance of
innovation. The first is absolute citation count,
which captures citations made within the 3-year
period from the year of patent grant date to the
3 years afterward. We use this measure to mit-
igate the issue of truncation at the end of the
sample. The second is relative citation count. This
measure calculates citations received for patents
filed and subsequently granted during the year of
the patent grant through the 3 years afterwards,
less the average number of citations during the
period received by the matching patents.We follow
Lerner, Sorensen and Strömberg (2011) and define
matching patents as those granted in the same
year and assigned to the same technology class.8
Because absolute and relative citation measures
require 3 years of forward patent data, and be-
cause our study requires citation measures for
3 years from the date of the buyout, we require a
total of 6 years of patent data from the date of the
buyout. This limits us to considering buyout trans-
actions up to 2011.
Control variables
Many factors drive innovative activity at the coun-
try and firm level. Following previous literature, we
control for these characteristics. In particular, we
include the intellectual property protection index
created by Park (2008) and the level of a country’s
innovativeness as measured by patent applications
scaled by GDP.
Hsu, Tian and Xu (2014) and Nanda and
Rhodes-Kropf (2013) show that financial market
development affects innovative activity. Thus, we
include equity development measures as proxied
for by the value of shares traded and scaled by
GDP, and two credit market development mea-
sures. CMD1 is domestic credit to the private sec-
tor. This is an important indicator of the ability to
finance production, consumption and capital for-
mation, which in turn affects economic activity.
CMD2 is domestic credit provided by the finan-
cial sector scaled by GDP, which measures bank-
8In order to identify the technology class, we use the PAT-
STAT - IPC classification.
ing sector depth and financial sector development
in terms of size. We also include the GDP growth
of a country to proxy for general economic condi-
tions. We provide definitions for all variables and
data sources in Table AI of the online Supporting
Information.
Sample characteristics
Table 1 gives the summary statistics. Panel A
presents the yearly distribution. The number of
patents increased significantly from the year 2000.
Similar to Lerner, Sorensen and Strömberg (2011),
we attribute this to the increasing volume and
growing share of technology firms, which typically
innovate to a greater extent. There was another
sharp increase in the number of public-to-private
buyout transactions after 2005, primarily due to
the cheap access to credit that was the main source
of financing for LBOs. Subsequently, in 2008, the
number of deals plummeted, to a level not seen
since the late 1990s. This was attributable to the
financial crisis, which caused a total standstill in
deals, although that number began to rise again
soon afterwards.
In Panel B, we show the distribution of trans-
actions by industry. Similar to previous studies
(e.g. Lerner, Sorensen and Strömberg, 2011), we




Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics for the
buyout sample (treated sample) and the control
sample (discussed in the ‘Research design’ section).
Our country-level controls for the buyout sam-
ple, such as the measure of intellectual property
rights (IPR), have a mean of 7.97. The country in-
novativeness intensity (INV) measure implies that
there are 1.66 patent applications submitted per
100 million of GDP, measured in US dollars. Eq-
uity market development (EMD) has a mean value
of 172.87. Mean credit market development, mea-
sured as private credit to GDP (CMD1), is 166.70,
and it is 200.17 when measured as domestic credit
provided by the financial sector to GDP (CDM2).
Average GDP growth is 2.15. Country-level con-
trols for the control sample are fairly similar.
We present several firm characteristics 1 year be-
fore the buyout transaction. The buyout sample
© 2020 The Authors. British Journal of Management published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd on behalf of British
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Table 1. Sample distribution: This table presents the sample construction and the target industry (Panel B) for deals announced from 1997
to 2011 with at least one patent granted to the target firm for the 3 years before to the 3 years after the transaction
Panel A: Distribution by year





1997 1 9 − −
1998 2 104 − −
1999 14 186 3 7
2000 16 2,431 10 93
2001 13 830 9 53
2002 14 410 3 16
2003 35 4,314 16 591
2004 19 725 11 25
2005 34 2,455 17 106
2006 30 3,967 15 1,024
2007 58 7,149 31 761
2008 19 520 9 47
2009 13 909 10 107
2010 14 243 11 73
2011 25 2,108 13 191
Total 307 26,360 158 3,094
Panel B: Distribution by industry





Agriculture 2 92 2 6
Construction 1 1 − −
Finance, Insurance 2 954 2 192
Manufacturing 187 23,888 94 2,608
Mining 3 12 1 1
Retail Trade 13 171 5 25
Services 80 1,108 44 237
Transportation 14 110 9 24
Wholesale Trade 5 24 1 1
Total 307 26,360 158 3,094
has total assets (ASSETS) of 1,098 on average,
while the control firms have sales (SALES) at a
level of 757. The research and development ex-
penditures (R&D) are on average 44.58, capital
expenditures (CAPEX) are 50.87 and free cash
flow (FCF) is 81.56. The differences, although
small, indicate that the control firms have more as-
sets, higher sales, spend more on research and de-
velopment, and have higher capital expenditures
and less free cash flow. Yet these differences are
not statistically significant, except for SALES and
CAPEX.
Subsequently, we compare both samples of
treated and control observations in terms of their
innovation. The firms targeted in the buyout trans-
actions have an average of 11.39 patents. The rel-
ative and absolute citations are 10.60 and 5.35, re-
spectively. Figure 1 presents the trends in patents
(A), absolute citations (B) and relative citations
(C). The sample of buyouts has a higher level of
innovation, yet the two samples show very distinct
trends over time. For example, in Panel A, we ob-
serve an increase in the number of patents in the
years before the buyouts; from year 0, the time
trends for both subsamples differ. The number of
patents for the buyout sample begins to drop, but
the number of patents for the control sample in-
creases steadily over time. The figures for citations
show similar trends.
Baseline regressions
In the multivariate analysis, we use patent count
and citations as dependent variables. Given that
the patent count variable is highly skewed, we
transform it into ln(1 + patent count) in the
© 2020 The Authors. British Journal of Management published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd on behalf of British
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Table 2. Summary statistics: This table presents the summary statistics for deals announced from 1997 to 2011
Treatment Control
Variable Mean S.D. Mean S.D.
t-Statistic for the
difference in means
IPR 7.97 0.49 8.00 0.48 1.64
INV 1.66 1.63 1.69 1.61 0.69
EMD 172.87 90.03 177.40 90.32 1.75
CMD1 166.70 41.41 168.57 40.52 1.55
CDM2 200.17 53.00 202.66 52.82 1.59
GDP_GR 2.15 1.75 2.15 1.72 −0.09
ASSETS 1,098 3,372 1,370 6,152 1.54
SALES 757 1,377 1,106 4,310 2.89
R&D 44.58 131.91 53.83 258.79 0.88
CAPEX 50.87 134.17 70.51 259.95 2.26
FCF 81.56 251.37 80.06 359.97 −0.14
regression analysis.9 In column (1) of Table 3,
we present the results of a ‘before–after’ analy-
sis, where we include industry, firm and country–
year fixed effects, and cluster standard errors by
firm.We find a significant decline in the number of
patent applications post-buyout transaction, rang-
ing from 18% in year 2 to 22% in year 3.10 This is
also economically significant, translating into up
to three less patents each year.
The innovation drop may be due to the fact that
PE firms tend to buy certain firms. In this analy-
sis, we match buyout firms to public firms by age,
profitability, year and country in order to mitigate
those concerns. Our empirical tests are based on
DiD methods, where we compare change in inno-
vation among firms that went through a public-to-
private buyout (the treatment group) with change
in innovation among a matched group of public
firms that remained public (the control group).
In column (2) of Table 3, we present the results
from the DiD methodology discussed earlier. The
results show a similar pattern, with a 17% drop in
the number of patents in year 2 and 22% in year
3 compared to public firms matched by year, size,
three-digit industry code and age.
In columns (1) and (2) of Table 4, we present the
results of ‘before–after’ analyses where the depen-
dent variables are ‘Absolute Citations’ and ‘Rela-
tive Citations’, respectively. We include industry,
firm and country–year fixed effects, and cluster
9In a previous version of this paper, we used the levels and
applied count models. The results were similar to those
reported here.
10The untabulated results are robust if we include country
and firm characteristics. However, including them reduces
the number of observations.
the standard errors by firm. We find a significant
decline in the number of citations post-buyout
transaction, ranging from 32% to 41% in year 2,
and from 36% to 46% in year 3.11
In column (2) of Table 4, we present the results
from the DiDmethodology. The results show a de-
cline in the number of citations from24% to 33% in
year 2, and from 22% to 30% in year 3, compared
to public firmsmatched by year, size, three-digit in-
dustry code and age. The 46% reduction in patent
citations measured as absolute citations translates
into up to five less citations each year compared to
themean number of absolute citations; the 36% re-
duction in patent citations measured as relative ci-
tations translates into up to two less citations each
year compared to the mean number of relative
citations.
Addressing endogeneity of the going-private
decision
A decision to delist a public firm is not random,
and therefore our analysis is subject to endogene-
ity. In the previous section, we attempted to mit-
igate this concern by performing a DiD analysis
that matches on industry, size, age and year. In this
subsection, we extend this analysis by employing
two alternative matching methods. First, we con-
struct a sample of matched firms that are similar
in terms of going-private characteristics. In par-
ticular, following Bharath and Dittmar (2010), we
identify several characteristics as future predictors
11The untabulated results are robust if we include country
and firm characteristics, but including them significantly
reduces the number of observations.
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Panel A. Patent Count
Figure B. Absolute Citations
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Figure 1. Innovation measures for treatment and control samples
over time: (A) patent count; (B) absolute citations; (C) relative
citations
of going private. We create a sample that is similar
to the buyout sample in terms of total assets, sales,
R&D, Capex, dividends, free cash flow, debt, cash
and net fixed assets12 measured at the time of IPO,
12There are many missing values for those variables.
Where possible, we replace them with industry-year
averages.
Table 3. Changes in innovation around the ‘going-private’ decision:




Coeff. t-Stat. Coeff. t-Stat.
Event year −3 0.0009 [0.01] 0.0395 [0.56]
Event year −2 0.0904 [1.17] 0.1061* [1.78]
Event year −1 −0.0039 [−0.06] 0.0404 [0.79]
Event year 1 −0.0862 [−1.52] −0.0712 [−1.41]
Event year 2 −0.1751*** [−2.68] −0.1739*** [−3.11]
Event year 3 −0.2194*** [−2.78] −0.2228*** [−3.20]





Columns (1) and (2) present OLS panel regressions for before–
after analysis, with the dependent variable ln(1 + number of
patents) in models (1) and (2). In model (1), we include industry,
firm and country–year fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered
by firm. Column (2) presents difference-in-differences regression
results. For each firm in the going-private sample, we include up
to five public firms (based on data availability) that are matched
to the going-private firms by year, size, three-digit industry code
and age. In all models, we show the regression where the indepen-
dent variables are the relative years pre- and post-buyout (event
year 0 is the omitted base category, with a coefficient normalized
to 1).
All variables are defined in Table AI. ***, ** and * denote 1%, 5%
and 10% significance levels, respectively.
which is on average 13 years prior to going private.
Similarly, as discussed previously, we include the
‘cell’ effects.
Second, in order to mitigate concerns that pre-
buyout innovation may affect the results, we con-
struct a sample of matched firms that are simi-
lar in terms of pre-innovation characteristics. This
should resolve any concerns that we are analysing
firms at different timelines in the innovation cycle.
We present the results from these two alternative
DiD analyses in Table 5. In columns (1) and (2),
we present the DiD results when firms are matched
on the going-private characteristics; in columns
(3) and (4), we present the results matched on 3-
year pre-innovation (measured by the number of
patents and citations in years 1 to 3), industry, size,
age and year characteristics. The results also show
a negative effect of going private on innovation.
The coefficients suggest a decline in the number of
citations, from 27% to 34% in year 2, and from 15%
to 25% in year 3.
Third, we verify whether the results are robust
to a different matching technique. We match
treated and control observations based on the
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Table 4. Changes in innovation around the ‘going-private’ decision: BA and DID specifications (from both going-private and control
samples)
Before–after DiD
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Coeff. t-Stat. Coeff. t-Stat. Coeff. t-Stat. Coeff. t-Stat.
Event year −3 0.0358 [0.21] −0.0401 [−0.26] 0.1013 [0.96] 0.0565 [0.62]
Event year −2 −0.0174 [−0.12] −0.0503 [−0.39] 0.1029 [1.17] 0.0995 [1.26]
Event year −1 −0.0779 [−0.60] −0.0734 [−0.63] −0.0021 [−0.03] −0.0011 [−0.02]
Event year 1 −0.1162 [−0.79] −0.1127 [−0.89] −0.0878 [−1.00] −0.0749 [−1.02]
Event year 2 −0.4070*** [−2.94] −0.3176*** [−2.67] −0.3284*** [−3.86] −0.2449*** [−3.35]
Event year 3 −0.4554*** [−3.41] −0.3632*** [−2.91] −0.3030*** [−3.34] −0.2162*** [−2.74]
Fixed effects Industry, firm, country × year Industry–size–age–year
Obs. 1,505 1,505 8,603 8,603
Columns (1) and (2) present OLS panel regressions for before–after analysis, with the dependent variables ln(1 + absolute citations)
in model (1) and ln(1 + relative citations) in model (2). In models (1) and (2), we include industry, firm and country–year fixed effects.
Standard errors are clustered by firm. Columns (3) and (4) present difference-in-differences regression results, with the dependent
variables ln(1 + absolute citations) in model (3) and ln(1 + relative citations) in model (4). For each firm in the going-private sample,
we include up to five public firms (based on data availability) that arematched to the going-private firms by year, size, three-digit industry
code and age. In all models, we show the regression where the independent variables are the relative years pre- and post-buyout (event
year 0 is the omitted base category, with a coefficient normalized to 1).
All variables are defined in Table AI. ***, ** and * denote 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels, respectively.
Table 5. Changes in innovation around the ‘going-private’ decision: DID specifications (from both going-private and control samples)
DiD
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Coeff. t-Stat. Coeff. t-Stat. Coeff. t-Stat. Coeff. t-Stat.
Event year −3 0.1679 [1.16] 0.0952 [0.72] 0.1491 [1.29] 0.1068 [1.08]
Event year −2 0.0896 [0.69] 0.0557 [0.48] 0.1441 [1.35] 0.1357 [1.44]
Event year −1 0.0104 [0.09] −0.0214 [−0.19] 0.0125 [0.14] 0.0023 [0.03]
Event year 1 −0.1151 [−0.85] −0.1020 [−0.86] −0.1362 [−1.25] −0.0953 [−1.02]
Event year 2 −0.3250** [−2.37] −0.2699** [−2.26] −0.3363*** [−3.06] −0.2660*** [−2.83]
Event year 3 −0.2528** [−2.10] −0.1825* [−1.68] −0.2136* [−1.82] −0.1516 [−1.52]
Fixed effects Going-private characteristics Pre-innovation, industry–size–age–year
Obs. 2,086 2,996
Columns (1) to (4) present difference-in-differences regression results, with the dependent variables ln(1 + absolute citations) in models
(1) and (3) and ln(1 + relative citations) in models (2) and (4). In columns (1) and (2) for each firm in the going-private sample, we
include one public firm (based on data availability) that is matched to the going-private firms on variables that determine the propensity
of going private measured for the prior 13 years: total assets, sales, R&D, Capex, dividends, free cash flow, debt, cash, net fixed assets
(we replace anymissing values with industry–year averages). In columns (3) and (4) for each firm in the going-private sample, we include
one public firm (based on data availability) that is matched to the going-private firms on pre-innovation measures: year, size, three-digit
industry code and age. Standard errors are clustered by firm. In all models, we show the regression where the independent variables are
the relative years pre- and post-buyout (event year 0 is the omitted base category, with a coefficient normalized to 1).
All variables are defined in Table AI. ***, ** and * denote 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels, respectively.
Mahalanobis distance measure on firm char-
acteristics such as industry, size, age and year.
The results are in Table 6. We continue to find
a negative and statistically significant effect of
public-to-private buyouts on innovation. The
coefficients are also of similar magnitude (i.e. we
observe a drop in the number of citations of 19%
to 26% in year 2, and up to 27% in year 3).
Further analysis
Institutional and management buyouts
In this subsection, we distinguish between IBOs
and MBOs, because we expect institutional in-
vestors to have different incentives and long-term
objectives than insiders such as firm management.
Theoretically, going private in a highly leveraged
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Table 6. Changes in innovation around the ‘going-private’ decision:
DID specifications (from both going-private and control samples)
DiD
(1) (2)
Coeff. t-Stat. Coeff. t-Stat.
Event year −3 0.0973 [0.86] 0.0620 [0.64]
Event year −2 0.1009 [1.07] 0.0986 [1.18]
Event year −1 0.0042 [0.05] 0.0058 [0.08]
Event year 1 −0.0880 [−0.94] −0.0567 [−0.74]
Event year 2 −0.2612*** [−3.03] −0.1886** [−2.52]
Event year 3 −0.2739** [−1.99] −0.1950 [−1.59]





Columns (1) and (2) present difference-in-differences regression
results, with dependent variables ln(1 + absolute citations) in
model (1) and ln(1 + relative citations) in model (2). In columns
(1) and (2) for each firm in the going-private sample, we include
one public firm (based on data availability) matched to the going-
private firms based on theMahalanobis distancemeasure on firm
characteristics such as industry, size, age and year. Standard er-
rors are clustered by firm. In all models, we show the regression
where the independent variables are the relative years pre- and
post-buyout (event year 0 is the omitted base category, with a
coefficient normalized to 1).
All variables are defined in Table AI. ***, ** and * denote 1%, 5%
and 10% significance levels, respectively.
IBO transaction does not relieve a target firm from
short-term pressures. In fact, servicing a huge debt
may preclude a firm from realizing long-term in-
vestment strategies. In contrast, in an MBO, the
insiders may be focused on servicing debt as well
as on long-term planning. They may have reputa-
tional and career concerns and, as a result, may de-
sire to keep the firm in solid shape after returning
it to the public sector.
Table AII of the online Supporting Information
presents the summary statistics when we divide the
buyout sample into IBOs and MBOs. MBOs have
a slightly lower level of innovation measured in
number of patents or citations, yet a higher level of
radical innovation (measured as number of patents
granted to firm i in year t that have at least one ci-
tation to non-patent literature). They also tend to
take place in countries with higher investor protec-
tion and less developed equity markets.
Table 7 (Panel A) shows ‘before–after’ and DiD
results for limiting the sample to IBOs only. We
find a significant drop in both absolute and relative
citations following IBOs. Panel B shows our results
for limiting the sample to MBOs only. Within all
models, we observe no statistically significant ef-
fect on absolute or relative citations post-buyout.
These results indicate that the negative effect from
buyouts is observed predominantly for IBOs, but
not for MBOs.
Radical innovation
Thus far, we have analysed various general mea-
sures of innovation. However, the nature of in-
novation can differ. Certain patents, for example,
may refer directly to scientific literature, and may
be consideredmore radical than incremental in na-
ture. Following Griffith and Macartney (2014), we
thus define radical innovation as the total num-
ber of patents granted to firm i in year t that
have at least one citation to non-patent literature
(NPL). NPL generally refers to scientific journals,
and therefore patents making citations to NPL are
likely to be new and represent radical innovations.
In order to identify the effect of buyouts on radi-
cal innovation, we limit our sample to target firms
that had at least one radical patent applied for and
granted within the period of 3 years before to 3
years after the buyout.
The results are in Table 8. We find that the num-
ber of radical innovations tends to drop after the
buyout transaction. We observe a statistically and
economically significant decrease in radical inno-
vation 1, 2 and 3 years post-buyout.
Innovation efficiency or short-term payoffs?
In previous subsections, we demonstrated that
innovation generally drops after going private.
This may be due to PE firms restructuring R&D
departments. We therefore look next at innovator
employment changes. If PE firms are focused on
long-term investment projects, we expect them
to expand and keep the R&D units operational.
Alternatively, if their focus is solely short term,
we expect to observe employment reductions in
innovator employment.
We create a novel measure of innovation effi-
ciency, computed as the number of patent appli-
cations filed and subsequently granted during the
year, divided by the number of unique innovators.
We consider unique innovators as those listed on
the patent application. If the same person is in-
cluded in multiple applications, we count that per-
son only once. This measure also considers how
efficiently a firm uses its R&D team following a
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Table 7. Institutional and management buyouts: Changes in innovation around the ‘going-private’ decision: BA and DID specifications
(from both going-private and control samples)
Panel A: Institutional buyouts
Before–after DiD
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Coeff. t-Stat. Coeff. t-Stat. Coeff. t-Stat. Coeff. t-Stat.
Event year −3 0.0388 [0.21] −0.0467 [−0.29] 0.0912 [0.81] 0.0581 [0.59]
Event year −2 0.0033 [0.02] −0.0310 [−0.23] 0.0994 [1.05] 0.1087 [1.29]
Event year −1 −0.0721 [−0.53] −0.0708 [−0.57] −0.0019 [−0.02] 0.0061 [0.09]
Event year 1 −0.1078 [−0.69] −0.1110 [−0.83] −0.0884 [−0.95] −0.0778 [−0.99]
Event year 2 −0.4402*** [−3.00] −0.3290*** [−2.59] −0.3552*** [−3.93] −0.2517*** [−3.24]
Event year 3 −0.4679*** [−3.26] −0.3451*** [−2.61] −0.3392*** [−3.51] −0.2404*** [−2.86]
Fixed effects Industry, firm, country × year Industry−size−age−year
Obs. 1,414 1,414 7,983 7,983
Panel B: Management buyouts
Before−after DiD
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Coeff. t-Stat. Coeff. t-Stat. Coeff. t-Stat. Coeff. t-Stat.
Event year −3 −0.0022 [−0.01] 0.0415 [0.11] 0.1426 [0.87] −0.0158 [−0.10]
Event year −2 −0.2758 [−0.68] −0.2924 [−0.70] 0.1237 [1.05] 0.0005 [0.00]
Event year −1 −0.1505 [−0.32] −0.1053 [−0.25] −0.0236 [−0.11] −0.1177 [−0.55]
Event year 1 −0.2213 [−0.54] −0.1339 [−0.34] −0.0851 [−0.48] −0.0815 [−0.54]
Event year 2 0.0081 [0.02] −0.1746 [−0.52] −0.0846 [−0.45] −0.1819 [−1.08]
Event year 3 −0.2981 [−1.00] −0.5887 [−1.37] 0.0253 [0.14] 0.0052 [0.03]
Fixed effects Industry, firm, country × year Industry−size−age−year
Obs. 168 168 798 798
Columns (1) and (2) present OLS panel regressions for before–after analysis, with the dependent variables ln(1 + absolute citations)
in model (1) and ln(1 + relative citations) in model (2). In models (1) and (2), we include industry, firm and country–year fixed effects.
Standard errors are clustered by firm. Columns (3) and (4) present difference-in-differences regression results, with the dependent
variables ln(1 + absolute citations) in model (3) and ln(1 + relative citations) in model (4). For each firm in the going-private sample,
we include up to five public firms (based on data availability) that arematched to the going-private firms by year, size, three-digit industry
code and age. In all models, we show the regression where the independent variables are the relative years pre- and post-buyout (event
year 0 is the omitted base category, with a coefficient normalized to 1).
All variables are defined in Table AI. ***, ** and * denote 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels, respectively.
buyout. Innovation efficiency can be improved by
either increasing the number of patent applications
while keeping the size of the R&D team constant,
or producing the same number of patent applica-
tions using a smaller R&D team.
The results for innovation efficiency are in Ta-
ble 9. Similar to the findings for patent counts,
radical patent counts, absolute citations and
relative citations, we find that buyouts have a sig-
nificantly negative effect on innovation efficiency.
The drop in innovation efficiency results from the
fact that the rate of decrease in innovation is higher
than the rate of decrease in the number of unique
innovators.
Syndicate size
PE investorsmay form syndicates, which are a con-
sortium of multiple investors that are financing the
same portfolio firm. There are several reasons for
this activity. There is some concern that such PE
partnerships may be colluding to depress prices.
For example, Officer, Ozbas and Sensoy (2010)
find a 40% overall ‘club deal discount’. How-
ever, Boone and Mulherin (2011) suggest other
reasons for consortium formations, such as scale,
risk and bidder expertise. Cumming (2006) sug-
gests that syndication, through better screening
and selection of investments, might reduce agency
conflicts.
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Table 8. Estimates of radical patent count
(1) (2) (3)
Coeff. t-Stat. Coeff. t-Stat. Coeff. t-Stat.
Event year −3 0.0035 [0.08] 0.0036 [0.08] 0.0479 [0.64]
Event year −2 0.0318 [0.84] 0.0309 [0.78] 0.0574 [0.97]
Event year −1 −0.0051 [−0.16] −0.0088 [−0.27] 0.0083 [0.17]
Event year 1 −0.0391 [−1.21] −0.0479 [−1.44] −0.0199 [−0.44]
Event year 2 −0.1071*** [−2.81] −0.1108*** [−2.79] −0.0936* [−1.68]
Event year 3 −0.1564*** [−3.66] −0.1664*** [−3.71] −0.1491*** [−2.64]
Country controls No Yes No
Firm FE No No Yes
Country–year FE No No Yes
Obs. 1,456 1,407 1,456
We present OLS panel regressions with the dependent variable ln(1 + radical count). In all models, we show the regression where the
independent variables are the relative years pre- and post-buyout (event year 0 is the omitted base category, with a coefficient normalized
to 1). Standard errors are clustered by firm.
All variables are defined in Table AI. ***, ** and * denote 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels, respectively.
Table 9. Estimates of innovation efficiency
(1) (2) (3)
Coeff. t-Stat. Coeff. t-Stat. Coeff. t-Stat.
Event year −3 −0.0008 [−0.02] −0.0002 [−0.01] −0.0388 [−0.74]
Event year −2 0.0172 [0.48] 0.0174 [0.49] −0.0085 [−0.17]
Event year −1 0.0246 [0.81] 0.0133 [0.44] −0.0263 [−0.68]
Event year 1 −0.0694** [−2.07] −0.0804** [−2.35] −0.1086** [−2.31]
Event year 2 −0.0745** [−2.22] −0.0854** [−2.53] −0.1035** [−2.15]
Event year 3 −0.0776** [−2.05] −0.0854** [−2.20] −0.0870 [−1.54]
Country controls No Yes No
Firm FE No No Yes
Country–year FE No No Yes
Obs. 1,456 1,407 1,456
We present OLS panel regressions where the dependent variable innovation efficiency is winsorized at 1%. In all models, we show the
regression where the independent variables are the relative years pre- and post-buyout (event year 0 is the omitted base category, with
a coefficient normalized to 1). Standard errors are clustered by firm.
All variables are defined in Table AI. ***, ** and * denote 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels, respectively.
PE consortiums may also be formed to certify
the deal quality of a highly levered transaction to
debtholders (Officer, Ozbas and Sensoy, 2010). As
these authors suggest, it may be relatively easier
to obtain debt financing and on more favourable
terms if there are multiple PE firms syndicating
the deal. We therefore expect that deals involving
a larger number of PE investors will obtain better
financing terms that will put less pressure on their
investment decisions. That could lead to less pres-
sure to cut investments in innovation.
In order to test this hypothesis, we divide our
sample into deals that have one or more PE
investors. The results are in Table 10. We ob-
serve negative and statistically significant effects of
public-to-private buyouts on innovation for deals
with only one PE investor. The coefficients sug-
gest a decline in the number of citations of 36%
to 47% in year 2, and 39% to 52% in year 3. We
find no statistically significant evidence of public-
to-private buyout transactions on innovation for
deals backed by a syndicate. This result supports
the intuition that syndicates, which generally en-
joy more favourable financing terms, try to avoid
cuts in long-term investments.
Buyouts and the cost of debt
Now that we have shown that innovation drops
after going private, the question is: Why do PE
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Table 10. Estimates of citations: syndicate size
Syndicate = 1 Syndicate > 1
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Coeff. t-Stat. Coeff. t-Stat. Coeff. t-Stat. Coeff. t-Stat.
Event year −3 0.0196 [0.10] −0.0149 [−0.09] 0.0969 [0.20] −0.1362 [−0.34]
Event year −2 −0.0876 [−0.56] −0.1101 [−0.76] 0.2543 [0.64] 0.1819 [0.58]
Event year −1 −0.0814 [−0.55] −0.0779 [−0.57] −0.0615 [−0.20] −0.0533 [−0.21]
Event year 1 −0.2298 [−1.35] −0.1991 [−1.30] 0.3264 [1.02] 0.2245 [0.89]
Event year 2 −0.4728*** [−3.00] −0.3601*** [−2.65] −0.1387 [−0.40] −0.1422 [−0.47]
Event year 3 −0.5150*** [−2.95] −0.3933** [−2.50] −0.2092 [−0.92] −0.2341 [−0.93]
Country controls No No No No
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country–year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Obs. 1,169 1,169 448 448
This table presents regressions where the dependent variable citation count is measured by absolute citations in columns (1) and (3)
and by relative citations in columns (2) and (4). In all models, we show the regression where the independent variables are the relative
years pre- and post-buyout (event year 0 is the omitted base category, with a coefficient normalized to 1). Standard errors are clustered
by firm.
All variables are defined in Table AI. ***, ** and * denote 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels, respectively.
firms pay for positive net present value (NPV)
projects, and then abandon them? It would be illu-
minating to examine the underlying reasons for the
post-buyout drop in innovation. Deep-pocketed
investors may seem more likely to nurture inno-
vation, because we expect them to better toler-
ate short-term failure. However, they seem to rely
heavily on debt financing. The debt overhang the-
ory of Myers (1977) posits that management of
an excessively leveraged firm will forgo positive
NPV projects if the new projects benefit debthold-
ers rather than equity holders.
In general, the buyout transaction is not only re-
lated to the change in ownership, it also changes
the target firm’s capital structure and shifts it to-
wards higher leverage. The buyouts are financed
mostly with debt, so as much as 80% of the trans-
action cost may be debt financing. At the time
of the buyout announcement, the acquirer and
the lender have agreed upon the terms and pay-
out structure. However, the debt portion may be
a significant burden for the planned restructur-
ing of the target firm during the buyout period.
Moreover, financing may be received from multi-
ple debt providers, which makes it more difficult
to effect a refinancing (Axelson et al., 2013; Colla,
Ippolito and Wagner, 2012; Demiroglu and James,
2010; Graham and Leary, 2011; Kaplan and Stein,
1993).
Financing in these highly leveraged transactions
is often defined as a fixed debt plan. The valuation
is made based on the assumption that debt is ex-
pected to be a function of time alone, agreed at
the time of the investment (Baldwin, 2001a, 2001b;
Cooper and Nyborg, 2018). Most prior studies
have analysed the effects of buyouts on investment
and productivity in isolation, but these decisions
are not typically separate. In this subsection, we
analyse the effects together.
It is critical for an acquirer to negotiate the best
debt terms for a buyout transaction. If an acquirer
can ex post lock in deal financing for subsequent
post-buyout years at a lower rate than that cur-
rently experienced by other market participants, it
will have a critical investment advantage over the
competition. Thus, the effect of the buyout on in-
novation should be positive. But the reverse also
holds. If an acquirer ex post locks in deal financing
at a higher rate than that of current market partic-
ipants, it may have a negative effect on investment
and innovation.
In order to control for the cost of debt, we in-
clude the relative ratio of the initial cost of debt at
the time of announcement, and the cost of debt in
the first, second and third years post-buyout, re-
spectively, in the regression analysis. Data on the
cost of debt come from Federal Reserve Economic
Data, and we use the corporate debt yield at the
time of announcement at the subgroup country
level.
Our results are presented in Table 11. They show
that the effect of the relative cost of debt after a
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Table 11. Estimates of citations with the cost of debt
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Coeff. t-Stat. Coeff. t-Stat. Coeff. t-Stat. Coeff. t-Stat.
Event year −3 0.0294 [0.27] 0.0358 [0.21] −0.0192 [−0.20] −0.0401 [−0.26]
Event year −2 0.0111 [0.12] −0.0174 [−0.12] 0.0142 [0.16] −0.0503 [−0.39]
Event year −1 −0.0523 [−0.63] −0.0779 [−0.60] −0.0386 [−0.53] −0.0734 [−0.62]
Event year 1 0.4005* [1.67] 0.4945* [1.68] 0.3216* [1.81] 0.4089* [1.82]
Event year 2 −0.1289 [−0.77] −0.1960 [−1.00] −0.1233 [−0.98] −0.1612 [−1.06]
Event year 3 0.0563 [0.29] 0.0435 [0.19] 0.0722 [0.41] 0.0481 [0.21]
CD year 1 −0.4493** [−2.19] −0.5743** [−2.37] −0.3776** [−2.52] −0.4905*** [−2.62]
CD year 2 −0.1743 [−1.45] −0.1903 [−1.43] −0.1141 [−1.30] −0.1410 [−1.32]
CD year 3 −0.3241** [−2.21] −0.3937*** [−2.61] −0.2827** [−2.27] −0.3246** [−2.29]
Country controls Yes No Yes No
Firm FE No Yes No Yes
Country–year FE No Yes No Yes
Obs. 1,393 1,561 1,393 1,561
This table presents regressions where the dependent variable citation count is measured by absolute citations in columns (1) and (2),
and by relative citations in columns (3) and (4). In all models, we show the regression where the independent variables are the relative
years pre- and post-buyout (event year 0 is the omitted base category, with a coefficient normalized to 1). Standard errors are clustered
by firm.
All variables are defined in Table AI. ***, ** and * denote 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels, respectively.
buyout transaction negatively affects innovation.
In particular, the CD (cost of debt) in year 1 af-
ter the buyout (i.e. the ratio of CD at the time
of announcement to CD at the first year post-
announcement) has a negative and significant ef-
fect on innovation. The CD in year 2 post-buyout
(the ratio of CD at the time of announcement
to that at the second year post-announcement)
has a negative but not significant effect on inno-
vation. The CD in year 3 post-buyout (the ratio
of CD at the time of announcement to CD at
the third year post-announcement) has a negative
and significant effect on innovation. Overall, this
means that the decrease in the post-buyout cost of
debt, compared to the initial cost of debt at the
time of announcement, has a negative effect on
innovation.
Interestingly, the effect of the post-buyout years
becomes positive in years 1 and 3, suggesting that
it is dependent on the relative cost of debt at
the year of announcement relative to the current
cost of debt. We posit that, if an acquirer is able
to lock in a lower cost of debt over the dura-
tion of the restructuring compared to the post-
buyout cost of debt, the incentives to innovate
will be stronger. However, if the current cost of
debt is lower than the cost of debt at announce-
ment, the investment in innovation will no longer
be lucrative, and the incentives to innovate will
decrease.
Robustness analysis and limitations
In subsequent untabulated tests, we analyse
whether the results hold for different subsamples.
We split our sample into public-to-private US and
non-US buyouts. The negative results are stronger
for the US subsample, but also hold for the non-
US subsample. We also divide the data into pre-
and post-2006 subsamples. Most previous studies
report the results for pre-2006 data. We check
whether a specific subperiod may be driving the
negative results. We find that they are mostly in-
significant for the pre-2006 subsample, and highly
significant for the post-2006 subsample.
We also collect data for private-to-private buy-
outs, which is a much larger sample than for
public-to-private buyouts. We find no significant
evidence of any effect on innovation for the full
sample of private-to-private buyouts. However,
when we split the sample into pre- and post-2006
subsamples, we find a negative association in year
3 post private-to-private buyout for the post-2006
period.
PE funds also engage in secondary buyouts
(SBOs). Research shows that, under pressure, PE
funds engage in more SBOs that ultimately under-
perform (Arcot et al., 2015). Secondary manage-
ment buyouts (SMBOs) also tend to performworse
than regularMBOs (Jelic, Zhou andWright, 2019;
Zhou, Jelic and Wright, 2014). We evaluate the
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extent to which our results may be affected by
these deals. Approximately 10% are SBOs. We
exclude those transactions, and our estimates
remain robust.
We are unable to disentangle the effects of board
advisory and PE human capital on innovation.
Thus, in order to mitigate any concerns about PE
characteristics in our analysis, we run a model
where we include PE firm fixed effects. The results
remain robust.
We also explore whether our results are ro-
bust to alternative estimation methods, where we
correct for serial correlation. We apply a linear
dynamic panel data model that includes a lagged
value of the dependent variable. The results are
similar to our main results, and show a negative
and statistically significant effect of buyouts on
innovation in years 2 and 3, post-buyout.
We caution that our results may overestimate
the negative effects of buyout transactions because
we are only observing what happens in the post-
buyout firm. It is possible that divisions or sub-
sidiaries are sold to another firm, and patenting
activity may continue there.
Moreover, our data are not rich enough to anal-
yse several remaining research questions, so we
leave them for future studies. For example, future
work may explore the effect of PE firm reputation
on innovation. Measures such as textual analysis
could analyse patent documents and their disclo-
sures. It could also be instructive to examine what
happens post-buyout transaction to divisions and
subsidiaries that are sold. We note that, in untab-
ulated analyses, we find little evidence of a drop in
innovation for a sample of private-to-private deals.
Future research may focus on the determinants of
those differences, and compare debt levels between
public-to-private and private-to-private deals.
Conclusion
This paper explores the impact of public-to-
private buyout transactions on the innovation of
target firms. We analyse both quantity (patent
count) and quality (citations) of patent activity.
Following public-to-private buyouts, we find that
firms tend to have fewer patents overall, and to
receive fewer citations on those patents. Firms
also have fewer radical (e.g. scientific) innovations.
We observe that the negative effect of public-to-
private buyouts is only significant for institutional
buyouts. We identify a significant decrease in inno-
vation efficiency post-going private. We also show
that the negative effect is most prevalent for trans-
actions where the cost of the debt financing is
higher than the post-buyout cost of debt.
Our results add to prior literature, but they
also contrast with those of Amess, Stiebale and
Wright (2016) and Lerner, Sorensen and Ström-
berg (2011), who show innovation increases af-
ter buyout transactions. However, those results are
driven mostly by private-to-private transactions.
Our study contributes by showing contrasting re-
sults for public-to-private transactions. The evi-
dence is based on a buyout sample and matched
sample analysis.
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